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Non-technical summary  
 
In contrast to residential electricity markets in Germany, the entry of newcomers in 
residential natural gas markets is not frequently observed. Newcomers might face difficulties 
in purchasing gas on the wholesale market and in transporting it across geographically 
distinct market areas within Germany. The latter caused by pipeline capacity constraints 
between those areas, while the wholesale markets, on the other hand, suffer liquidity 
problems. For newcomers themselves gas imports to Germany are de facto unrealizable due 
to pipeline bottlenecks at the border. These pipelines are operated by gas importing firms, 
which maintain long-term contracts with mainly foreign gas producers. About 90 percent of 
total consumption is imported by 5 major gas importing firms. Two of those namely, E.on 
and RWE, are extensively forward integrated with retail (downstream) incumbents supplying 
retail markets. Due to potential abuse of the market power in wholesale and retail markets, 
the German Federal Cartel Office prohibited further forward integration from 2005/2006 to 
2010. The Authority argued that the very few dominant gas importing companies, which also 
own and operate the gas pipelines, could have an incentive to foreclose the competitors or 
deter entry in retail markets.  
Our study aims at investigating the effects of vertical integration between gas importers and 
retail incumbents on market entry of newcomers. To preserve retail subsidiaries’ profits, 
natural gas importers may wish to deter market entry, since in markets for household 
customers entry induces business stealing rather than market expansion. To analyze possible 
vertical integration issues empirically we employ cross sectional data (for September 2009) 
for about 500 sub markets for household customers in Germany. For this purpose ownership 
and market entry data were merged, and market and consumer characteristics were taken 
into account. Applying a structural entry model, which is based on market entry model 
introduced by Bresnahan and Riess (1991), our estimation results do not show clear 
evidence that market entry of newcomers is restricted by vertical integration. Therefore, we 
conclude that the decision of the German Federal Cartel Office to repeal the regulation of 
vertical integration in 2010 was appropriate. However, the estimation results show that in 
high quality gas markets, there are more market entries than in low quality gas areas. 
Further investigations have to be conducted for those markets. 
 
 
  
 
 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
 
Im Vergleich zum Strommarkt für Haushaltskunden in Deutschland ist die Anzahl neuer 
Wettbewerber, die in den seit Jahren liberalisierten Gasmarkt eingetreten sind, sehr gering. 
Dies könnte daran liegen, dass sowohl die Gasbeschaffung auf dem Großhandelsmarkt als 
auch möglicherweise der Transport zwischen unterschiedlichen Großhandelsmärkten 
innerhalb Deutschlands problematisch sind. Insbesondere die Kapazitätsengpässe der 
Hochdruckleitungen zwischen den Großhandelsmärkten und die Tarifstruktur stellen 
Hindernisse für die Händler dar. Zudem sind es die illiquiden Großhandelsmärkte, die den 
Handel und damit den Wettbewerb nicht richtig aufkommen lassen. Der eigenständige 
Import aus dem Ausland ist für neue Wettbewerber ebenfalls kaum zu bewerkstelligen, denn 
die Pipelinekapazitäten an den Grenzen sind mittel- bzw. langfristig ausgebucht. Fünf große 
Gasimporteure, die einen großen Teil der Verbrauchsmenge nach Deutschland importieren 
(etwa 90%), betreiben die Pipelines und kontrollieren damit das gesamte 
Gasfernleitungsnetz in Deutschland. Zwei dieser Gasimporteure, nämlich E.on und RWE, sind 
auch im Einzelhandel aktiv bzw. halten viele Beteiligungen an ehemaligen Monopolisten im 
Einzelhandel. Aufgrund dieses Missbrauchspotentials im Groß- und Einzelhandel, das durch 
die Kontrolle der Wertschöpfungskette begründet ist, untersagte das Bundeskartellamt 
weitere vertikale Verflechtung bzw. die Eigentumsbeteiligung der Gasimporteure an 
Einzelhandelsunternehmen in den Jahren 2005/2006 bis 2010. 
Das Ziel dieser Analyse ist die Erforschung der Effekte der vertikalen Integration bzw. der 
Verflechtung der Gasimporteure mit dem Einzelhandelsunternehmen auf die Markteintritte 
von Wettbewerbern. Denn die vertikal verflochtenen Unternehmen haben möglicherweise 
den Anreiz den Wettbewerb im Einzelhandel zu verhindern, da Markteintritte zu einem 
intensiveren Wettbewerb führen. Um dies empirisch zu untersuchen, wurden 
Querschnittsdaten für etwa 500 Märkte (für September 2009) aus unterschiedlichen Quellen 
herangezogen. Diese beinhalten nicht nur Informationen über die Eigentumsstruktur, 
sondern auch über Markteintritte sowie Markt- und Kundencharakteristiken. Für die 
Schätzung wenden wir das strukturelle Markteintrittsmodell von Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) 
an. Unsere Schätzergebnisse zeigen keine eindeutigen negativen Effekte auf die 
Markteintritte, die durch vertikale Verflechtung entstehen könnten. Deshalb war die 
Aufhebung des aufgehängten Verflechtungsverbots durch das Bundeskartellamt im Jahr 
2010 sinnvoll. Allerdings zeigen die Ergebnisse, dass in Märkten mit geringer Gasqualität 
weniger Eintritte zu beobachten sind, was tiefergehender untersucht werden sollte. 
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Introduction 
 
Natural gas in Europe and in Germany is of strategic importance for electricity generation 
and heating. Since Germany`s decision in 2011 to phase out nuclear electricity generation, 
natural gas has become more crucial for the security of the nations’ electricity supply. Beside 
electricity generation, gas is used extensively for cooking and heating in German households. 
Despite the economic crisis in 2007/2008, price changes and other shocks in recent years, 
households’ total gas demand has remained constant. Interestingly, as the wholesale gas 
price fell in 2009, the prices for household customers followed the wholesale price changes 
only moderately.  
In contrast to residential electricity markets in Germany, the entry of newcomers in 
residential gas markets is rather rare. Newcomers might face difficulties in purchasing gas on 
the wholesale market and in transporting it across geographically distinct market areas 
within Germany. The latter caused by pipeline capacity constraints between those areas, 
while the wholesale markets, on the other hand, suffer liquidity problems. For newcomers 
themselves gas imports to Germany are de facto unrealizable due to long run pipeline 
bottlenecks at the border. These pipelines are operated by gas importing firms, which 
maintain long-term contracts with mainly foreign gas producers. About 90 percent of total 
consumption is imported by 5 major importing firms. Two of those, E.on and RWE, are 
extensively forward integrated with downstream incumbents supplying the retail markets. 
Due to potential abuse of market power at upstream and downstream level the Federal 
Cartel Office prohibited further forward integration of natural gas importers (NGI) from 
2005/2006 to 2010.1 The Authority argued that the very few dominant gas importing 
companies, which are already extensively integrated and also own and operate the gas 
pipelines, could have an incentive to foreclose existing competitors or prevent potential 
market entry.  
There exist a large number of studies on vertical integration. In general, the effects of 
vertical integration on downstream market performance could be twofold. Potential 
efficiency gains caused by vertical integration under a particular market structure are well 
known in theoretical literature. For example, double marginalization is an argument in favor 
of vertical integration. In contrast, concerns about negative welfare effects caused by 
foreclosure or exclusion of competitors are rare and brought forward only in particular 
industries. Hastings and Gilbert (2005) analyzed the US gasoline market and found evidence 
for foreclosure. Another example is Chipty (2001) for Cable TV programs. Chipty’s analysis 
shows that vertical integrated firms tend to exclude rivals by denying access to the 
distribution network. Most of the conducted research, however, does not find any evidence 
                                                     
1 Long term contracts with a length of more than 4 years were also prohibited from 2006 until 2010. 
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that integration cause exclusion of rivals.2 Thus, vertical integration is classified as less 
harmful than horizontal integration. 
In this paper, we aim at shedding light on the effects of the vertical integration of gas 
importing companies with downstream incumbents on potential newcomers and their 
decisions to enter a particular geographically delineated sub market for household 
customers. We employ cross sectional data for September 2009 and analyze the impact of 
integration on newcomers’ variable profits. Our empirical model is based on market entry 
model introduced by Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), which describes the equilibrium number 
of newcomers in a local market. This model is relies mainly on the assumption that entry 
occurs as long as expected profits of potential entrants are non-negative. Under particular 
assumptions the model allows revealing the variable profit of newcomers and the magnitude 
of the effects arising from vertical integration. 
The paper is organized as follows. First, we briefly describe the German gas market and 
discuss the potential problems newcomers probably face by entering downstream markets. 
In the next section, we discuss the free market model and show how it could reveal the 
information we need to make a statement about effects of vertical integration on 
newcomers’ variable profits. In section 4 we describe the data employed in our empirical 
analysis. The data have been merged from different sources and required extensive analysis 
of the ownership structure. We continue with a discussion of the empirical specification and 
show the estimation results. In the final section, we present a conclusion based on the 
results. 
 
German natural gas market 
 
The gas market in Germany consists of two main sub-markets: gas trading and gas 
transportation. While gas trading at the wholesale and retail level has been liberalized, the 
transportation, as a natural monopoly, is regulated. In contrast to the German electricity 
market, the liberalization process of the gas market was extremely tedious due to numerous 
regime changes. The starting point for the liberalization was the introduction of European 
law that forced all European countries to open their network industries for competition at 
the end of the 1990s. As the gas market structures among the countries differed from each 
other substantially, each country had the opportunity to implement its own regulations und 
requirements within the given framework. This led to different market designs. Some 
countries, including Germany, engaged in a trial and error process to select the best working 
market mechanism. So, for example, the regulation of gas transport with a so called ‘point to 
point’ regime, which required that a firm that wanted to supply a customer in area A while 
the gas is in B, had to negotiate and sign contracts with all pipeline and distribution system 
operators that lie between A and B. Since there could be numerous operators to negotiate 
                                                     
2 See, e.g., Hortascu and Syverson (2007) for the cement industry, Mullin and Mullin (1997) the steel industry. 
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with, this type of regulation led to high transaction costs and became impracticable. Based 
on this experience the Federal Network Agency (BNetzA) has switched to another regime 
which allows the firms to ship gas with only two formal agreements. The so called ‘entry-
exit’ model requires one contract for ‘entry’ (point where gas from outside enters a pipeline 
or a network system) and one contract for ‘exit’ where gas is taken out the network (for 
example by a consumer). In contrast to ‘point to point,’ the handling between entry and exit 
point is realized solely by network operators. The network access charges for the volume 
which enters and exits the system are regulated. This type of market design turned out to be 
more successful than the previous one and led to some market entry of newcomers. 
However, the trial and error process caused a delay in development of competition 
compared with the electricity market in Germany. 
Figure 1: Natural gas market structure in Germany 
 
Natural gas demand in Germany is mainly satisfied by gas imports. As mentioned above, 
about 90 percent of the total market consumption (914 TWh/a in 2009) has to be imported 
to Germany; it comes mainly from Russia, Sweden and the Netherlands. There are five firms 
at the wholesale level that import gas to Germany and which cover almost the entire 
consumption. Natural gas importers (NGIs) generally have long term contracts with foreign 
natural gas producers. Usually, these are take-or-pay contracts signed for up to 25 years, 
where the price might be tied (with a time lag of 6 months to) to the oil price.3 Most of the 
long-term contracts originated before market liberalization took place. Beside the gas 
import, the NGIs also operate their own pipeline systems in Germany and control the 
connecting points at the German border.4  In the case that a competitor would like to import 
                                                     
3 Germany acts as a transfer country for natural gas transport from Eastern Europe to France, Spain or Italy. 
Usually, foreign firms have to buy pipeline capacities from German NGIs if they are not operating their own. 
4 In a special report, the Federal Network Agency investigated the competition between pipelines and 
concluded that NGIs’ pipelines, in fact, do not face competition. The geographic location of pipelines is an 
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gas to Germany, existing bottlenecks at the German border could put an end to that project. 
The capacities are booked out for a long period in advance (at least two years in advance), 
mostly by the NGIs.5  
 
Beside the lack of available capacity at the German border, the upstream (wholesale) market 
is geographically divided into several market areas. These are delineated by capacity 
constraints of connecting points between different pipelines (operators). If for example E.on 
and RWE each operate a pipeline that have a common connection point without any 
capacity constraints, then the two pipelines delineate one market area. In contrast, capacity 
constraints at the connection point would divide this area into two market areas, even when 
these are not physical but contractual capacity constraints.  Each market area has its own 
virtual wholesale market. Trading across markets is not only difficult, due to the capacity, 
but also expensive. Since the ‘entry-exit’ rule applies also in cross market trading, a firm with 
gas located in market A that wants to supply customer in market B pays an ‘exit’ charge in A, 
an ‘entry’ charge in B and finally  an ‘exit’ charge in B when customer withdraw gas out of 
the system.  Among other factors, this causes a low liquidity in the wholesale market. 
Interestingly, upstream market areas equaled the areas served by only one gas importer and 
pipeline operator. However, the NGIs were under the pressure to reduce the number of 
market areas through bilateral agreements. Consequently, the number of the upstream 
market areas fell from 13 in 2007 to 6 in October 2009.6 To overcome the liquidity problem 
the authority aims at reducing the number of wholesale markets to only two by October 
2013.  
 
Wholesale trading takes place mainly over the counter. In general, the importers signed 
bilateral supply contracts with retail incumbents. Until 2006, these contracts used to have a 
very long duration (up to 25 years). Between 2006 and 2010 the Federal Cartel Office 
prohibited such long term contracts and allowed only contract terms with maximum 4 years. 
Only a marginal part of the total consumption (1.6 percent of all trades in 2009) is traded at 
the energy exchange. Although some of the regional network operators buy their balancing 
gas at the exchange, it still is quite illiquid. Therefore, the resulting price at the exchange is 
not a reference price for other wholesale contracts.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
important factor for the competition intensity between operators. As the pipelines are connected with the 
distribution network in regional and local markets, suppliers in retail markets can transport gas only through 
the pipelines which have a connection to a local market that they would like to supply. Thus, the majority of 
downstream network operators, which have access to only one pipeline, would suffer monopoly pricing and 
discrimination. Therefore, the Federal Network Agency has implemented the regulation of the access charge 
for pipelines. 
5 Interestingly the capacity constraints arise from the contractual situation rather than from physical 
constraints. 
6 In general a ‘gas-year’ in Germany begins in October and ends in September in the following year. Therefore, 
most changes in structure, prices and demand are realized or implemented in October. 
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The downstream retail market for household customers in Germany is geographically 
divided into 700 sub markets. According to German Competition Authority, the markets are 
geographically delineated by the supplied area of a distinct distribution network operator. 
Thus, only one distribution network operator serves a sub market. As in the electricity 
markets, this market definition is applied, in cases of abuse of market power of dominant 
firms, by the Authority. In each of these markets only one incumbent supplier (former 
monopolist) is providing gas to the majority of household customers. Mostly the incumbent 
is vertically integrated with the distribution network operator and switching of households 
from incumbent to new supplier is very rare. Beginning with market liberalization until the 
end of 2009 only about 5 percent of the overall household consumption was supplied by 
firms other than the local incumbent. On average, the incumbent has 90 percent of the 
market share for household customers. Compared with electricity markets in Germany, gas 
markets still lack newcomers. On average there are only five newcomers and six ‘incumbent-
entries’ in each of these markets (in 2009). However, one has to distinguish between 
newcomer und incumbent entries. The latter means that an incumbent in market A enters 
retail market B where another incumbent serves the customers.7 We discuss the difference 
while describing the data below.  
 
Until 2009 the main issue for newcomers, however, remained the upstream market that 
lacked liquidity and available pipeline capacities. The situation has changed slightly since 
October 2009: the number of wholesale market areas has been reduced from 13 to 6, and, 
at the same time, the gas consumption of German manufactures decreased significantly due 
to the worldwide financial crisis. Since that time, the prices at the wholesale markets have 
dropped and gas importers that had long term take-or-pay contracts with foreign gas 
producers met problems due to gas price coupling to the (world) oil price. Thus, if a contract 
was tied in with the oil price, the NGI had to pay a higher price to the producer than the 
price he received at the German wholesale market. Interestingly, the retail prices for 
household customers dropped by only nine percent while the prices at the wholesale market 
decreased more than 50 percent.8 Regardless the crisis and the price drop the household gas 
consumption remained constant.  
 
While the major importing firms operate their own pipelines, two of them are extensively 
forward (vertically) integrated with the downstream incumbents. E.on and RWE are the 
biggest importers and besides the forward integration with retail incumbents they also have 
their own retail departments. In our analysis we distinguish between own downstream (self-
operated), direct forward integrated and indirect integrated incumbents. The latter is the 
case when the importer does not directly holds stakes in downstream incumbents but 
through other (shareholding) subsidiaries. Moreover, E.on and RWE are fully integrated with 
local distribution network operators in their self-operated retail markets. Thus, they control 
                                                     
7 In some cases local incumbent and ‘entrant’ are the same firm, so they are horizontally integrated. This allows 
brand and price differentiation for those customers who want to switch suppliers. 
8 Bundesnetzagentur 2010 
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the complete vertical chain. Observing this market structure, the question arises how 
strategic interventions of dominant upstream and downstream incumbents could affect 
market entry of newcomers.  
Econometric model 
 
While the bulk of vertical integration literature focuses on firms’ performance differences 
which arise through integration, we are rather interested in the effects of vertical integration 
on competitors. In particular, we are interested in answers to question how forward 
integration affects the market entry decision. We presume that in downstream markets for 
household customers (where the incumbent is a subsidiary of one of the major gas 
importers) retail competitors face higher (upstream) costs. The rationale could be the 
protection of the own downstream subsidiary from competition and retaining the generated 
profits in downstream. As household consumption is assumed to be constant9 (at least in the 
short run), entry of newcomers triggers business stealing effects rather than market 
expansion effects.10 Thus, the first derivative of given total demand function in market i, D𝑖 = D𝑖(N𝑖,∙), with respect to the number of competitors N𝑖 is equal zero: 𝜕D𝑖𝜕𝑁𝑖 = 0. 11 
However, the individual demand of each firm d𝑁 is negatively affected by the number of 
competitors: 𝜕d𝑁
𝜕𝑁𝑖
< 0. Thus, poaching customers results in lower prices than without market 
entry.12 Given this demand situation and the entry effect, a vertically integrated incumbent 
potentially loses market share in its retail business. Now assume that at the profit function 
of the integrated incumbent is 𝜋 = (𝑃𝑑 − 𝑐𝑢 − 𝑐𝑑  )𝑑𝑑 + (𝑃𝑢 − 𝑐𝑢)(𝐷 − 𝑑𝑑), where 
𝑑𝑑 = 𝑑𝑑(N𝑖,∙) is incumbent’s demand in downstream, 𝑃𝑗 incumbent’s prices in downstream 
and upstream, respectively. The marginal costs downstream and upstream are represented 
in 𝑐𝑗. The losses in the downstream market when entry occurs could be compensated with 
additional profits at the wholesale level by selling the residual demand, 𝐷𝑅 = 𝐷 − 𝑑𝑑, to 
newcomers at the optimal 𝑃𝑢. Thus, if the integrated incumbent is the only one supplying gas 
at the wholesale level, the total profit is maximized by choosing the optimal number of 
newcomers 𝑁 as they affect downstream and, at the same time, the upstream profit of the 
monopolist.13  
Two aspects have to be noticed: First, beside the price inelastic household demand firms 
supply also industry customers that show lower price elasticity and market expansion effects 
may appear to be due to higher downstream competition. Second, there could be other 
upstream firms active in the market. However, in 2009 many wholesale markets were 
                                                     
9 Bundesnetzagentur 2010 
10 See for example Ferrari & Verboven (2010) who consider the two effects caused by market entry of new 
press shops. 
11 In case of market expansion, we rather would observe ∂Di
∂Ni
> 0, that is, total demand rises with additional 
market entry. 
12 See also the extensive literature on pricing behavior in markets with switching and searching costs. 
13 See for example Ferrari & Verboven (2010) 
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delineated by an area supplied by a single pipeline operator and a gas importer. Despite the 
fact that the price at the gas exchange fell in 2009 the liquidity problem remained in that 
market areas. If a newcomer wanted to buy gas at a liquid wholesale market, the transport 
to the target market could be either costly because of the ‘entry-exit’ regulation or not 
possible due to capacity constraints.  
To analyze vertical integration effects on market entry decisions of newcomers we use an 
empirical entry model, which has been introduced by Bresnahan and Reiss (BR, 1991) and 
describes the equilibrium number of newcomers in a market. The assumption of free entry is 
associated with the zero profit condition, that is, as long as one firm earns non-zero profits 
potential competitors will enter the market if their expected profits are non-negative. The 
entry process continues until a potential entrant’s expected profits are negative. Due to free 
market entry, the profits of all entrants fall to zero as the assumption in BR model is that all 
firms are equal and earn the same profits if they decide to enter the market.14 So, the zero 
profit condition is required to identify the variable profits or the fixed costs of the firms, 
respectively. The main question we are interested in is how variable profits are affected by 
market and demand characteristics which influence newcomers’ entry decisions into the 
downstream market. 
 
Let us assume that a firm enters market i and earn profits: 
𝜋𝑁 = 𝑑𝑁𝑣𝑁 − 𝐹𝑁, 
where  𝑑𝑁  is N-firm’s demand, 𝑣𝑁 per-capita variable profit and 𝐹𝑁 firm’s fixed cost. Further 
decomposition of the total variable profit 𝑉𝑁 leads to: 
𝜋𝑁 =  𝑆𝑘𝑁(𝑃𝑁 − 𝑐𝑁) − 𝐹𝑁. 
As we consider entry of 𝑁 newcomers, competition is poaching customers away from 
incumbents. Thus, newcomers compete for customers with relatively low search and 
switching costs who are willing to switch their current incumbent supplier. Switching occurs 
when related costs are lower than the price difference and savings, respectively. The 
demand for each newcomer can be defined as a product of total market size  𝑆  and a 
fraction of customers 𝑘𝑁 which are attracted by a newcomer. Due to the symmetry 
assumption, all newcomers have the same market share 𝑘𝑁. The per firm demand multiplied 
with per-capita profit, that is equilibrium price 𝑃𝑁 minus variable cost 𝑐𝑁, equals the total 
variable profit 𝑉𝑁 = 𝑆𝑘𝑁(𝑃𝑁 − 𝑐𝑁). The newcomers which have entered the market set the 
equilibrium price 𝑃𝑁 that determines the demand for newcomers. We abstract from price 
discrimination that newcomers could be engaged in and, as in BR, assume symmetry among 
newcomers, so that everything, including costs and resulting profits, is the same for each 
newcomer. 
 
The determinants of total variable profit are then: 
                                                     
14 This assumption is reasonable as the newcomers considered here were not involved in gas market before 
market liberalization and have no ownership links to incumbents which presumably have a different cost 
structure. 
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𝑉𝑁(𝑌𝑖,𝑍𝑖,𝑁𝑖 ,𝑃𝑁 ,𝑋𝑖,𝑊𝑖 ,𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖) = 𝑆𝑖 (𝑌𝑖)𝑘𝑁(𝑃𝑁,𝑍𝑖)[𝑃𝑁(𝑁𝑖,𝑍𝑖 ,𝑊𝑖,𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖) − 𝑐𝑁(𝑊𝑖,𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖)] 
where the market size 𝑆𝑖  in market i is a function of the usual market characteristics 
𝑌𝑖 which determine the total market demand, such as total number of households, number 
of houses or buildings with many flats and further exogenous variables that we discuss in the 
data section. The fraction of customers that switch to a newcomer depends on the 
equilibrium price 𝑃𝑁 and on the customers’ characteristics, 𝑍𝑖. For example, a customer with 
higher education is more likely to switch than a customer with lower education.15  All 
characteristics of customers in a particular market captured in 𝑍𝑖   affect the fraction of 
switched customers. Thus, total market demand multiplied with the fraction 𝑘𝑁 equals 
newcomer’s demand 𝑑𝑁. The equilibrium price is a function of the number of competing 
firms 𝑁𝑖, customer characteristics 𝑍𝑖, market specific cost shifters 𝑊𝑖, such as distribution 
charges, and finally the ownership structure of local incumbent 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖. We capture the 
degree of integration 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖 taking values [0, 1] on importers’ shares in downstream 
incumbent. 
BR assume that fixed cost of newcomers, 𝐹𝑁, beside the variable profits, are affected by the 
number of entrants. We give up this assumption because we do not think that this applies in 
the gas market for household customers. Thus, our fixed cost 𝐹𝑁(𝑊𝑖) in the profit function 
𝜋𝑁  is not affected by the number of newcomers in a certain market, affected are rather the 
variable profits of newcomers due to increased competition. We assume that local cost 
shifters 𝑊𝑖, in particular the density in market area, which should be correlated with 
advertising costs, have an impact on the fixed cost.  
 
As free entry lowers firms’ profits in a particular market to zero, this results in the following 
equilibrium number of firms that a market can host: 
𝜋𝑁 = 𝑉𝑁(𝑁𝑖,∙)− 𝐹𝑁 ≥ 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝜋𝑁 = 𝑉𝑁(𝑁𝑖 + 1,∙) − 𝐹𝑁 < 0,  
which means that if an additional firm enters the market all newcomers gain negative profits 
due to the symmetry assumption. Therefore, in equilibrium we would observe the 𝑁𝑖 
newcomers each with 𝜋𝑁 ≥ 0. This restriction allows identifying the fixed cost and variable 
profit shifters as 𝑉𝑁(𝑁𝑖,∙) ≥ 𝐹𝑁 > 𝑉𝑁(𝑁 + 1𝑖 ,∙), e.g., firms enter as long as their fixed costs 
are covered by the variable profits.  
 
Econometric specification 
 
To estimate the effects of vertical integration, we first specify the profit function of a 
newcomer 𝜋𝑁 =  𝑆𝑘𝑁(𝑃𝑁 − 𝑐𝑁) − 𝐹𝑁. Here, we follow the approach of Abraham et al. 
                                                     
15 A survey conducted by the geo-marketing company Axciom shows which of the customer characteristics are 
correlated with the willingness to switch their supplier.  
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(2007) and take logarithmic specification instead of linear functions as in BR. Below we show 
the specifications for the components of the profit function: 
𝑆𝑖 (𝑌𝑖) = exp (𝑌𝑖𝜆) 
𝑘𝑁(𝑃𝑁 ,𝑍𝑖) = exp(𝑍𝑖𝜈𝑧 + 𝑊𝑖𝜈𝑤 + 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖𝜈𝑜 − 𝜈𝑁) 
𝑣𝑁(𝑁𝑖,𝑍𝑖,𝑊𝑖,𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖) = 𝑃𝑁 − 𝑐𝑁 = exp (𝑍𝑖𝑎𝑧 + 𝑊𝑖𝑎𝑤 + 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖𝑎𝑜 − 𝛼𝑁) 
𝐹𝑁(𝑊𝑖) = exp (𝑊𝑖𝜂𝑤) 
As demand data is not available we apply a reduced profit model. The vectors of the 
parameters 𝜆, 𝜈𝑧 , 𝜈𝑤, 𝜈𝑜 ,𝑎𝑧 ,𝑎𝑤,𝑎𝑜 ,𝜂𝑤  show the effects of the exogenous factors that we 
include in our estimation. The effects of market entry or the number of newcomers are 
captured in parameters 𝜈𝑁  and 𝛼𝑁 in the demand equation and per-capita profit equation, 
respectively.  Note that in contrast to Abraham et al. (2007) per firm market share does not 
increase with the number of newcomers. Due to business stealing effects, which exceed 
market expansion effects, the per firm share of switchers would decline with increasing 
number of firms. The same is true for per-capita profit that declines with the number of 
competitors. Thus, increasing 𝜈𝑁 and 𝛼𝑁 indicate a decrease in per firm profit due to market 
entry.  Assembling all the specified profit function components and including error terms for 
variable profit and fixed cost functions, we construct the total profit function: 
𝜋𝑁 = exp [𝑌𝑖𝜆 + 𝑍𝑖(𝜈𝑧 + 𝑎𝑧) + 𝑊𝑖(𝜈𝑤 + 𝑎𝑤) + 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖(𝜈𝑜 + 𝑎𝑜) − 𝜈𝑁 − 𝛼𝑁 + 𝜀𝑣]
− exp [(𝑊𝑖𝜂𝑤 + 𝜀𝐹)] 
Applying the non-zero profit condition to the profit function we obtain the compactly 
written function 
𝜋𝑁 = −𝜃𝑁 + 𝑌𝑖𝜆 + 𝑍𝑖𝛽 + 𝑊𝑖𝛿 + 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖𝛾 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗 ≥ 0, 
with 𝛽 = 𝜈𝑧 + 𝑎𝑧;   𝛿 = 𝜈𝑤 + 𝑎𝑤 − 𝜂𝑤;   𝛾 = 𝜈𝑜 + 𝑎𝑜;   𝜃𝑁 = 𝜈𝑁 + 𝛼𝑁;   𝜖𝑖𝑗 = 𝜀𝑣 − 𝜀𝐹 
Note that we can identify the effect of market entry on variable profits with 𝜃𝑁 but we 
cannot distinguish between 𝜈𝑁 and 𝛼𝑁,  separately. The error term 𝜖𝑖𝑗 , which consists of the 
error 𝜀𝑣 in variable profit function and the error 𝜀𝐹 in fixed cost function, captures all 
unobservable factors, in the regional market j  and the enclosed local market i, such as cost 
and demand shifters that are not in our data sample. The definition of our markets follows in 
the next section. The error term is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and 
standard deviation σ. Further discussion on property of the error term follows in the next 
section. 
 
According to our assumptions, market entry of a potential competitor does not occur if the 
following condition holds:  
 
𝑌𝑖𝜆 + 𝑍𝑖𝛽 + 𝑊𝑖𝛿 + 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖𝛾 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗 < 𝜃1 .  
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The general term of the argument with N firms can then be written as: 
  𝜃𝑁 ≤ 𝑌𝑖𝜆 + 𝑍𝑖𝛽 + 𝑊𝑖𝛿 + 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖𝛾 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗 < 𝜃𝑁+1,  
 
where 𝜃𝑁 and 𝜃𝑁+1  are the threshold conditions or boundaries to observe exactly N firms.  
 
As we assume a standard normal distribution for the error term  𝜖𝑖𝑗, the probability that a 
market entry does not occur, i.e. 0 newcomers are in the market, is given by: 
 Pr (𝜋0) = Pr(𝑌𝑖𝜆 + 𝑍𝑖𝛽 + 𝑊𝑖𝛿 + 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖𝛾 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗 < 𝜃1) = Φ(𝜃1 − 𝑌𝑖𝜆 − 𝑍𝑖𝛽 −𝑊𝑖𝛿 −
𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖𝛾),  
 
where Φ(∙) is the cumulative distribution function of standard normal distribution and 
where the econometric model follows the ordered probit model. Thus the probability for N 
firms is then given by: 
 Pr (𝜋𝑁) = Φ(𝜃𝑁+1 − 𝑌𝑖𝜆 − 𝑍𝑖𝛽 −𝑊𝑖𝛿 − 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖𝛾) −Φ(𝜃𝑁 − 𝑌𝑖𝜆 − 𝑍𝑖𝛽 −𝑊𝑖𝛿 − 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖𝛾).  
 
Finally, the probability of observing 5 or more newcomers in a market is: 
 Pr(𝜋5) = 1 −Φ(𝜃5 − 𝑌𝑖𝜆 − 𝑍𝑖𝛽 −𝑊𝑖𝛿 − 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖𝛾). 
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Data  
 
Market definition 
A crucial factor in this study is the definition of the market. We could, for example, use the 
market definition of the Federal Cartel Office (FCO) which delineated the relevant market for 
household customers in cases of abuse of market power. Thus, the geographical delineation 
of the relevant market equals the area served by one local distribution network operator 
and one former downstream monopolist as mentioned in the market description section. 
These markets, which are very heterogeneous with respect to the covered area, we call 
incumbent-markets. In the northern part of Germany the market areas are usually larger 
than in south Germany. Conversely, in south Germany the population and thus the density in 
markets is greater. In each of the incumbent-markets only one incumbent (former 
monopolist) serves the majority of the customers. However, for our purposes, market 
definition according to the FCO might not be suitable. We observe that the newcomers, if 
they decide to offer gas contracts to households, do that not necessarily throughout the 
entire incumbent-market but in a particular zip-code area within an incumbent-market. As 
the incumbent-market might accommodate more than one zip-code area, a cherry-picking 
strategy is possible. As a consequence, in some cases newcomers’ offers are limited to 
households living in a zip-code area that is one of the few in the incumbent-market. To 
distinguish between the two market definitions we refer to zip-code-markets and 
incumbent-markets. As we consider the entry of newcomers that do not offer gas contracts 
necessarily throughout the incumbent-market, and given the differences in demographic 
structure among the zip-code areas, we define a zip-code area as the relevant market. Note 
that the former monopolists’ offers are available throughout an incumbent-market and not 
only in a specific zip-code area. Furthermore, the market specific costs, such as distribution 
charges, are the same in all zip-code markets within an incumbent-market.  
Because the covered areas of the incumbent markets are different, we face some difficulties 
in cases where, in one zip-code area, two incumbent-markets coexist. Our data for market 
characteristics is at the zip-code level which means that without further information on the 
distribution of these characteristics between the two markets making a clear cut assignment 
is not possible. To avoid any distortion, we decided to consider only the zip-code areas with 
one single incumbent. Nevertheless, in our estimation we have to take into account the fact 
that different zip-code-markets could be assembled to one incumbent-market.  
 
As zip-code markets which are part of one incumbent-market might all be affected by 
common shocks, the error term 𝜖𝑖𝑗 captures the unobservable determinants in zip-code 
market i and incumbent-market j. In case an incumbent-market accommodates more than 
one zip-code market, we allow the error term to correlate between those zip-code markets 𝑖 
which are located within the 𝑗 market. Otherwise, the assumption of independent 
distribution of the error term would be violated. As mentioned above, since the incumbent 
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offers throughout the incumbent-market there could be factors which influence profits of 
newcomers located only in i but also ones offering throughout the incumbent-market 𝑗. Also 
cost unobservables, for example, required payments which are set up by the local authority 
(for example pipeline path charges) are relevant in all zip-code areas in the incumbent-
market, have to be taken into account.16 Thus, 𝜖𝑖𝑗  captures also the variables in j which 
affect the profits of all newcomers independent of their zip-code-market choice. There are 
also cost shifters in 𝑊𝑖 which are valid throughout the incumbent-market but also which are 
zip-code-market specific. 
Entrants and newcomers 
We employ data on all offers at zip-code level available at Verivox, which is one of the 
biggest price comparison platforms for customers who want to switch their current contract 
or supplier. The database includes firms that have entered a specific zip-code market by 
offering a gas contract to household customers. We consider the number of firms that offer 
contracts for households with yearly 20,000 kWh consumption.17 It seems that a huge 
number of market entries occurred but we have to distinguish between different entrant 
‘types’ by analyzing their ownership structure as we otherwise not able to distinguish 
between newcomers, entry of affiliated firms and incumbent entry. For example, E.on and 
RWE have created discount brands (‘E Wie Einfach’ and ‘Eprimo’) and compete with other 
entrants in particular markets. Besides, we observe recent market entry of former local 
monopolists (incumbents) in other markets. Nevertheless, both the importing firms and the 
former local monopolists do not face the problems of the newcomers (as described above) 
which first have to purchase gas at the wholesale market. We are particularly interested in 
‘real’ newcomers and thus have selected firms out of the database that do not have any 
ownership in relation to incumbent companies. Nevertheless, any market entry decision 
depends on the number of existing firms in the market regardless the ownership relations, 
and thus, we control for the number of entrants which either are former local monopolist or 
linked with gas importing firms. The vertically integrated importing firms can influence only 
newcomers’ entry decision. Therefore we treat the number of incumbent-entrants as 
exogenous.18  
 
 
 
                                                     
16 One example is so called „Konzessionsabgabe’ which is a permit fee set by the local authority and paid by the 
suppliers. Unfortunately, we do not have that specific data and capture that in the error term. 
17 This is the typical consumption of a 4 person household or a 100 m2 flat. 
18 We also distinguished between incumbent-entrants which are based in the neighbor local market and non-
neighbor-incumbent-entrants. Most of them are non-neighbor-incumbent-entrants. 
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Demand and market characteristics 
The market and customer characteristics we use for our estimation proxy electricity demand 
in zip-code-markets. Data on characteristics are provided by Acxiom, a geomarketing firm 
that collects such kind of data. Firms that are interested in market entry make use of the 
data to screen for the most promising entry opportunities. We selected, in particular, 
variables which correspondent with the total market demand, such as number of 
households, buildings or age of buildings. Furthermore, we use customer characteristics, 
which reflect the probability of switching to another supplier, as demand shifters. The entry 
of newcomers causes business stealing rather than market expansion wherein, thus, we 
have to take into account characteristics which are correlated with the probability of 
switching. According to results of a survey conducted by Acxiom with household customers 
the probability of switching is higher among customers with higher education, ages 18 to 40 
and with higher monthly income.19 Acxiom have created an index which shows the 
household status in terms of education and income, which we also employ.  
 
Market characteristics are mainly the distribution charges which have to be paid if a firm 
supplies a customer in a retail market. For household customers these are two part tariffs 
with a variable charge and a fixed part independent of the consumption (the fixed charge 
also includes the fixed metering price). The distribution charges are regulated and differ 
among incumbent-markets. The data are provided by E’net, one of the biggest energy 
information providers in Germany. The databank allows also the geographical delineation of 
incumbent-markets and the market areas. We are able to distinguish between the 
(wholesale) market areas to which the incumbent-markets are connected and control for 
that in our estimation. Note that several retail incumbent-markets have access or are 
connected to more than one market area. 
Another variable that enters into the equation affects the fixed cost of the entrants. The 
density of zip-code-market influences the marketing costs of entering firms. The higher the 
density, the more potential customers can be convinced to switch. Thus, fixed costs in dense 
markets might be lower compared with rural markets. 
  
                                                     
19 Acxiom conducted a survey among 1.5 Million household customers with 300.000 replies. 
14 
 
Ownership structure  
To identify both the ‘real’ newcomers and forward integrated firms we use data provided by 
Creditreform. The databank contains ownership information that allows the detection of 
ownership links which are not directly observable at first glance. As gas importers’ shares in 
the target downstream firm not only held directly but rather on detours, this is a crucial 
analysis to determine the ultimate firm that holds the stakes at the end of the ownership 
chain. Figure 2 exemplarily shows E.on’s vertical shares in downstream incumbents. Node 0 
means that E.on itself operates as downstream incumbent (or has a retail department) in 
particular markets. Node 1 shows the shares that E.on directly holds in downstream 
incumbents and for example node 4 indicates E.on’s ownership link through 4 intermediary 
firms. As shown in this figure 2, E.on has 7 nodes at the most. In all nodes greater 1 the 
ultimate share of an importer in a retail incumbent have to be computed. For example, if 
E.on holds 60 percent in a firm B, and B in turn has 50 percent share in downstream 
Incumbent A, when the E.on’s ultimate share in A is 0.6*0.5=0.3, i.e., is 30 percent.20 
Figure 2: E.on's vertical ownership structure 
 
 
For our purposes, we distinguish between self-operated, directly linked and indirectly linked 
ownership relations. The latter describes the cases for nodes greater than 2. In contrast, 
directly linked are all the firms with nodes 1 and 2.21 
Descriptive statistics  
                                                     
20 There are several ways to compute the ultimate share of a firm which are discussed in the literature. For 
example the so called ‘weakest link’ rule, which in the example above, results in an ultimate share of 50 
percent. See, for example, Bortolotti et al. (2007)  
21 We define the cases in the second node as directly linked because the majority of the links go through 
shareholding firms of the importing companies which were set up to manage the numerous stakes. Recently 
E.on was forced by the EU Commission to sell its holding society Thüga, which managed E’ON’s more than 200 
(mostly minority) stakes in downstream companies. Thüga is in our data sample. 
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As we want to investigate how market entry of newcomers is affected by vertical 
integration, our first look is directed towards the distribution of the number of newcomers 
depending on vertical relation with an importer. The left graph in Figure 3 shows the 
distribution of number of newcomers in zip-code markets where the incumbents are not 
integrated with gas importers. In contrast, a negative skew of distribution is observed in 
markets with vertically linked incumbents (indirect shares are not considered). The 
comparison of distribution shows that the number of entrants is higher in markets with 
vertically linked incumbents.  
 
 
 
As mentioned above, we distinguish between zip-code markets and incumbent-markets. 
These are not necessarily equal as Table 1 shows. In our sample, 5900 zip-code markets are 
covered by only 510 incumbent-markets with a mean of 11 zip-code areas.  
 
Table 1: Number of natural gas submarkets 
Number of zip-code markets 5879 
Number of incumbent-markets 511 
Zip-code markets per incumbent market: min 1 
Average 11.5 
Maximum 404 
 
Table 2 shows the variables we have included in our estimation. The endogenous variable is 
the number of newcomers whose ownership is independent from gas importers and 
downstream incumbents. In each of the zip-code markets there is at least one newcomer 
active and the maximum number of newcomers is 9. We have grouped the number of 
newcomers in our estimations for markets with 5 and more newcomers. Regarding the 
ownership structure we use dummy variables which indicate when the share of importers’ 
Figure 3: Distribution of newcomers 
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exceeds 50 percent.22 Furthermore, we take into account further competitors, i.e., the 
number of incumbents that entered a new market.23 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
# of newcomers Number of newcomers 4.317 0.938 1 9 
      
Market Size 𝐘𝐢      
# of households (hh) in (1000) 5.241 4.485 0.004 28.089 
# of buildings age > 15 in (1000) 0.351 0.307 0.001 2.695 
# of buildings age < 25 in (1000) 1.739 1.415 0.002 12.292 
# individual houses in (1000) 1.428 1.253 0.001 12.599 
# of buildings > 3 Apt in (1000) 0.417 0.461 0 3.07 
      
Demand Shifters  𝐙𝐢      
Share of hh age < 40 # hh age < 40/ # hh 0.357 0.034 0.222 0.573 
Share high-status hh # hight status hh/ # hh 0.279 0.237 0 1 
Share of 4-pers. hh # 4-pers. hh/ # hh 0.122 0.033 0 0.25 
Purchasing power 3-pers. hh In Euro (Mio.) 79.905 67.104 0.05 571.536 
Jobless rate In Percent 8.850 4.972 0 32.7 
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Cost Shifters 𝐖𝐢      
Network charge (log) Charge for 20,000 kWh (4-pers. 
hh) 
5.453 0.222 3.599 6.420 
Density # hh/ area (in 1000) 1.117 2.492 0.003 27.404 
      
Further Competitors      
# of Incumbent-Entrants Incumbents that entered new 
markets 
6.986 3.191 0 18 
      
Self- operated Incumbents 𝐎𝐰𝐧𝐢 
E.on_avacon  0.036 0.186 0 1 
E.on_bayern  0.032 0.176 0 1 
E.on_hanse  0.069 0.253 0 1 
                                                     
22 We also considered the shares in our estimation, however, the results remain unchanged. 
23 As we are interested in the entry of newcomers we treat the number of incumbents that offer contracts in 
other markets, and thus compete with newcomers, as exogenous. To take into account the influence of the 
entered incumbents on newcomers’ profitability we include that number in our estimation. 
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E.on_mitte  0.017 0.131 0 1 
E.on_thüringen  0.016 0.125 0 1 
E.on_westfalen  0.007 0.082 0 1 
E.on_edis  0.008 0.087 0 1 
RWE  0.032 0.176 0 1 
  Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Direct Ownership 𝐎𝐰𝐧𝐢 
D. E.on > 50% Dummy: 1 if more than 50 
percent 
0.083 0.275 0 1 
D. RWE > 50% Dummy 0.018 0.134 0 1 
      
D. GDF > 50% Dummy 0.004 0.061 0 1 
E.on direct share Direct share in downstream 
incumbent  (%) 
11.696 20.380 0 66.5 
RWE direct share in (%) 2.833 11.293 0 100 
VNG direct share in (%) 0.851 4.487 0 25 
GDF direct share in (%) 0.190 3.098 0 51 
 
Endogeneity  
The market characteristics which we do not observe might be correlated with the vertical 
ownership and with the number of entrants. In particular markets which are profitable for 
entry are probably also attractive for importers to integrate forward with the downstream 
incumbent. As we consider the entry in particular zip-code area, newcomer’s decision to 
enter a market will depend on characteristics at zip-code level. For example, a newcomer 
would enter a market if, given the demand characteristics in the zip-code market, the 
expected profits are positive. In contrast, a gas importer might want to integrate forward if 
the demand characteristics for the entire incumbent-market area are promising. This 
depends not only on household demand but also on industry and business customers. Table 
3 illustrates the number of served zip-code areas of each of E.on’s downstream incumbents. 
Table 3: E.on's self-operated downstream incumbents 
E.on’s downstream subsidiaries 
(self-operated) 
Number supplied zip-code markets Number supplied zip-code 
markets, with one unique 
incumbent 
E.on Hanse 504 406 
E.on Avacon 227 211 
E.on Bayern 203 189 
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E.on Thüringen 128 94 
E.on Mitte 120 102 
E.on Edis 73 45 
E.on Westfalen Weser 42 40 
 
Furthermore, both E.on and RWE are also the major electricity producers, maintaining about 
50% percent of the production capacities in Germany. Therefore, importer’s decision to 
integrate could also be caused by the fact that most of the downstream incumbents supply 
gas and electricity and serve the majority of the customers in both markets. In contrast, GDF, 
VNG and Wintershall, the other gas importing companies, are active solely in the gas market 
and are hardly forward integrated with downstream incumbents. 
 
Estimation results and discussion 
 
We ran five estimations with independent equations between which we vary the controls. 
The estimation results are shown in Table 6 in the appendix. The first estimation includes 
only the market size, demand and cost shifters without considering the ownership relations 
and without controlling for the upstream market areas. In the second and third equation, we 
take into account the number of competitors (in terms of incumbent-entrants) and the 
ownership relations, respectively. In the fourth equation we include all controls for upstream 
market areas. The references are the incumbent-markets that are not assigned to a specific 
market area. As mentioned above, the importers’ downstream ownership is correlated with 
the geographical location of the market area, therefore we take out the market areas which 
could cause a bias in the results for markets with vertically integrated incumbents in the fifth 
estimation. 
With regard to the effects of market size, the results show a positive but insignificant effect 
of the number of households on market entry throughout all estimations. The age of the 
buildings is an important aspect for indicating market size. In particular in zip-code areas 
where the buildings are relatively new (< 15 years), heating with gas does not seem to be 
very common. In areas with older buildings (> 25 years) demand is not significantly affected 
by the number of buildings in the last two equations although the parameter has a negative 
sign. Both type of buildings, individual houses and buildings with more than 3 apartments, 
show significant positive effects in last two equations. However, considering the effects of 
market size on variable profits, it is shown that in almost all estimations the impact of our 
variables is relatively low.  
Apparently, there are other factors that significantly affect the variable profits of 
newcomers. If we consider the demand shifters and their effects on variable profits in the 
first equation, we observe insignificant coefficients in our first estimation, although almost 
all variables have the expected coefficient sign (except for the share for 4-person 
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households). When we add the number of incumbent competitors to the first equation, 
result shows a significant positive effect of growing competition. This means that in markets 
with more incumbent-entrants we observe more newcomers. We interpret this result as lack 
of market information (or market knowledge) of newcomers. As incumbents are very well 
informed about market and demand characteristics which reflect the potential demand, 
newcomers follow the decision of incumbents by entering the same markets.24 Please recall 
that we assume the number of incumbent-entrants to be exogenous. 
The cost shifters, in particular the network charges, show rather unexpected result. The 
coefficient for the regulated network access charge is not significant. This result is opposed 
to findings in electricity markets as shown in Nikogosian and Veith (2011). The study shows 
that the number of entrants is strongly affected by the network charge. Nevertheless, the 
electricity markets are much more competitive compared to gas markets as the number of 
entrants is significantly higher in the former. Regarding the density in a zip-code market, as 
fixed cost shifter, it shows the expected result with positive sign and significance in all but 
first estimation. The higher the density the lower the fixed costs, for example, for marketing. 
Our third estimation includes the vertical ownership variables (but do not control for the 
market areas). The result shows positive coefficients for almost all markets with self-
operated downstream incumbents. Thus, we do not observe any negative effects of vertical 
integration on newcomers’ profit functions in integrated markets. In markets with directly 
controlled downstream incumbents, the effects are not significant. In the fourth estimation 
where we control for market areas, the results for E.on Avancon, Hanse and Thüringen show 
surprising changes. In contrast to previous results the coefficients turn from positive to 
negative and remain statistically significant. Disregarding the market areas of E.on and RWE 
in the last estimation due to multicollinearity issues, again change the coefficients with the 
exception of E.on Hanse. The results for markets with RWE’s operated downstream 
incumbents also vary substantially throughout the last three estimations. Nevertheless, the 
results are statistically not significant when we control for market areas. 
Furthermore, it seems that in markets in which customers are supplied with ‘L-Gas’ (low 
quality gas) from the Netherlands or Sweden less newcomers are active compared to the ‘H-
Gas’ (high quality gas) markets. Currently, the European Commission works on the issues 
associated with different gas qualities and aims at harmonizing of the gas quality in Europe. 
Considering the impact of further market entry on newcomers’ profits, the results show that 
further market entry reduces newcomers’ profits. However, the profit reduction caused by 
                                                     
24 This result is robust and the coefficient for the number of incumbent-entrants is significant and positive in all 
estimations. By adding this variable in our second estimation the coefficients for the demand shifters change as 
well. In particular, the share of households with members younger than 40 changes the sign from positive to 
negative and turned out to be significant. The same is true for purchasing power although the sign of the 
coefficient remains the same. This indicates the multicollinearity of the number of incumbent-entrants with 
those two demand shifters. However, we keep the competition measure in our estimations since it seems that  
newcomers follow incumbents’ decision and have a significant effect on the profitability of newcomers. 
20 
 
the entry of up to four firms does significantly affect the profits of entered newcomers. Since 
competition is poaching the customers from each other (especially from the incumbent), 
competition intensity does not necessarily depend on the number of the newcomers but on 
the price set by firms. Thus, in the extreme case of Bertrand competition two firms are 
enough to reach perfect competition where the price reveals the (average) variable costs. As 
there are other competitors, in terms of incumbent-entrants, in the market the effects of 
further newcomers seem to be negligible.25  
 
Conclusion 
 
The study aims at investigating the effects of vertical integration between gas importers and 
retail incumbents on market entry, in particular on profits of market newcomers. To 
preserve retail subsidiaries’ profits, natural gas importers may wish to prevent market entry, 
since in markets for household customers entry induces business stealing rather than market 
expansion. For importers it might be possible to hurt newcomers by the limited availability 
of gas in the wholesale market which is caused by limited foreign purchasing sources and 
pipeline capacity bottlenecks at German border but also within Germany. Moreover, the 
pipelines are owned and operated by the (five) major importers. In particular, E.on and RWE, 
as dominant gas importers, are extensively engaged in downstream business, holding shares 
in retail incumbents or operating their own downstream subsidiaries. To analyze possible 
vertical integration issues empirically we apply the empirical market entry framework of 
Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) employing data for about 500 sub markets for household 
customers. For this purpose ownership and market entry data were merged, and market and 
consumer characteristics were taken into account. Controlling for upstream (wholesale) 
market areas within Germany, we obtained the results identifying the retail markets in 
which retail sub markets entry is unlikely, for example, due to vertical integration and 
wholesale liquidity issues.  
The results of our empirical analysis show that in a few downstream markets in which E.on 
has a self-operated subsidiary, the number of newcomers is small compared with other 
markets. Nevertheless, this outcome seems to be not robust. Therefore, further 
investigations have to be conducted for those integrated markets that show significant 
negative effect on market entry as a clear cut result is not possible here. The coefficients for 
direct ownership do not appear to be significant. In sum, we do not find clear evidence that 
market entry is restricted by vertical integration of gas importers and retail incumbents. 
Therefore, we conclude that the decision of the FCO to repeal the regulation of vertical 
integration in 2010 was appropriate.  
                                                     
25 Although gas itself is a homogenous product, differentiation in prices and contracts details (such as contract 
term) for certain customer groups (usages) is commonly used by gas suppliers. This may relax competition 
between the firms and can also lead to negligible effects on profits caused by market entry. 
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Furthermore, we show that in high quality natural gas markets, there are more market 
entries than in low quality gas areas. This might be due to liquidity issues specific to these 
markets. Surprisingly, the results also show that market entry of newcomers and their profits 
are positively affected by the number of incumbent-entrants that already entered the 
market. In contrast, demand characteristics play a minor role. In-depth market knowledge of 
incumbent-entrants can be the rationale behind this finding.  
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Appendix A:  
 
Table 4 reports the number of newcomers both in incumbent-markets and in zip-code-
market.  
Table 4: Number of newcomers 
Number of entrants in incumbent-market in zip-code-market 
1 7 20 
2 105 419 
3 177 1146 
4 189 1591 
5 106 1369 
6 59 1194 
7 34 1307 
8 14 238 
9 4 61 
Sum 695 7345 
 
Geographical location of integrated markets 
Table 5 shows the relation between the location of the downstream subsidiary and the 
importer’s covered upstream (wholesale) market area. About 70 percent of RWE’s self-
operated downstream incumbent markets are within their own upstream market area (RWE 
H-Gas Market area). In contrast, E.on’s self-operated downstream incumbent markets do 
not have control in their own market area. Nevertheless, the incumbents that supply about 
30 percent of the zip-code markets located in E.on’s upstream market area, have direct 
ownership link to E.on.  
Table 5: Relation ownership and upstream market area 
 Self-operation Direct Forward 
Integration 
Indirect Forward 
Integration 
RWE H-Gas Market Area 0.7155 0.1048 -0.0193 
RWE L-Gas Market Area 0.2399 -0.0763 -0.0506 
    
E.on H-Gas Market Area -0.0725 0.2857 0.0942 
E.on L-Gas Market Area 0.1527 -0.1617 -0.1533 
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Appendix B:  
Table 6: Estimation results 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
       Market Size Effects  𝝀           
# of households (hh) 0.085 0.079 0.078 0.028 0.010 
 (0.053) (0.052) (0.056) (0.055) (0.057) 
# of buildings age < 15 -0.351 -0.312 -0.537* -0.844*** -0.742** 
 (0.372) (0.319) (0.322) (0.315) (0.323) 
# of buildings age > 25 -0.463** -0.139 -0.349* -0.213 -0.165 
 (0.229) (0.204) (0.187) (0.216) (0.210) 
# of individual houses 0.205 0.159 0.402 0.434* 0.398* 
 (0.292) (0.262) (0.245) (0.241) (0.240) 
# of buildings > 3 Apt -0.212 -0.017 0.478 0.662* 0.831** 
 (0.392) (0.395) (0.403) (0.377) (0.390) 
 Demand Shifters  𝜷      
Share of hh age > 40 0.145 -4.125* -5.347** -0.770 -1.285 
 (2.497) (2.382) (2.722) (2.702) (2.597) 
Share high-status hh 0.571 0.403 0.487 0.296 0.161 
 (0.385) (0.326) (0.334) (0.354) (0.330) 
Share of 4-pers. hh -2.782 -0.635 -1.888 -1.090 0.086 
 (2.416) (2.108) (1.986) (1.658) (1.732) 
Purchasing power 3-  -0.001 -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
pers. hh (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Jobless rate -0.005 0.007 -0.010 -0.023 -0.033 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.021) (0.022) 
 Cost Shifters  𝛅      
Network charge (log) 0.263 0.169 0.092 0.271 0.303 
 (0.421) (0.380) (0.382) (0.309) (0.326) 
Density 0.032 0.063** 0.080** 0.092*** 0.080** 
 (0.027) (0.030) (0.032) (0.031) (0.033) 
# of Incumbent-   0.274*** 0.289*** 0.334*** 0.349*** 
Entrants  (0.027) (0.032) (0.044) (0.043) 
Ownership Effects  𝜸      
 
     
E.on_avacon 
  0.485** -1.571*** -0.663 
 
  (0.195) (0.513) (0.455) 
E.on_bayern 
  1.631*** 0.717** 0.686** 
 
  (0.155) (0.365) (0.293) 
E.on_hanse 
  0.500*** -1.221*** -1.094** 
 
  (0.188) (0.461) (0.462) 
 
 
 
      
26 
 
 
 (continued) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
E.on_mitte 
  1.176*** -0.507 0.218 
 
  (0.166) (0.629) (0.448) 
E.on_thüringen 
  0.232 -1.004* -0.356 
 
  (0.300) (0.522) (0.498) 
E.on_westfalen 
  1.441*** 0.856 0.789 
 
  (0.225) (0.619) (0.487) 
E.on_edis 
  1.551*** 1.500*** 1.350** 
 
  (0.405) (0.572) (0.540) 
RWE 
  0.820*** -1.266 0.089 
 
  (0.149) (1.002) (0.721) 
Direct Ownership 
     
D. E.on > 50%   0.312 -0.342 0.031 
   (0.579) (0.459) (0.456) 
D. RWE > 50%   0.278 0.099 0.483 
   (0.335) (0.521) (0.374) 
D. GDF > 50%   0.403 -0.242 0.203 
   (0.288) (0.298) (0.231) 
Market Area Controls      
Bayernets    0.982*** 1.009*** 
    (0.315) (0.305) 
BEB H-Gas    1.470*** 0.853*** 
    (0.337) (0.274) 
BEB L-Gas    0.229 -0.041 
    (0.269) (0.237) 
E.on H-Gas    1.143***  
    (0.242)  
E.on L-Gas    0.063  
    (0.215)  
Erdgas Münster    -0.000 -0.231 
    (0.361) (0.323) 
EWE    -2.234*** -1.972*** 
    (0.432) (0.392) 
GDF    -0.119 -0.722*** 
    (0.305) (0.277) 
GVS-ENI    1.258*** 0.870** 
    (0.357) (0.377) 
Ontras-VNG    1.775*** 1.421*** 
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  (continued) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
    (0.386) (0.345) 
RWE H-Gas    0.126  
    (0.320)  
RWE L-Gas    -0.423*  
    (0.220)  
Wingas    0.721*** 0.870*** 
    (0.258) (0.238) 
Newcomers’ Entry Effects 
𝛉𝐍 
     
θ2, Firm 2 -2.106 -2.239 -3.186 -0.190 -0.447 
 (2.510) (2.250) (2.219) (2.134) (2.228) 
      
      
θ3, Firm 3 -0.718 -0.708 -1.592 1.750 1.323 
 (2.490) (2.227) (2.193) (2.114) (2.217) 
      
      
θ4, Firm 4 0.095 0.228 -0.606 2.966 2.448 
 (2.527) (2.273) (2.235) (2.113) (2.213) 
      
      
θ5+, Firms 5+ 0.727 1.038 0.246 3.996* 3.425 
 (2.523) (2.269) (2.245) (2.129) (2.221) 
      
 Observations 5,879 5,879 5,879 5,879 5,879 
Log likelihood -6166 -5207 -5014 -4361 -4545 
 
*, **, *** represent significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
 
 
